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Abstract
We consider the problem of finding stationary Nash equilibria (NE) in a finite discounted general-sum stochas-
tic game. We first generalize a non-linear optimization problem from Filar and Vrieze [2004] to a N -player set-
ting and break down this problem into simpler sub-problems that ensure there is no Bellman error for a given state
and an agent. We then provide a characterization of solution points of these sub-problems that correspond to Nash
equilibria of the underlying game and for this purpose, we derive a set of necessary and sufficient SG-SP (Stochas-
tic Game - Sub-Problem) conditions. Using these conditions, we develop two actor-critic algorithms: OFF-SGSP
(model-based) and ON-SGSP (model-free). Both algorithms use a critic that estimates the value function for a
fixed policy and an actor that performs descent in the policy space using a descent direction that avoids local min-
ima. We establish that both algorithms converge, in self-play, to the equilibria of a certain ordinary differential
equation (ODE), whose stable limit points coincide with stationary NE of the underlying general-sum stochastic
game. On a single state non-generic game (see Hart and Mas-Colell [2005]) as well as on a synthetic two-player
game setup with 810, 000 states, we establish that ON-SGSP consistently outperforms NashQ [Hu and Wellman,
2003] and FFQ [Littman, 2001] algorithms.
Keywords: General-sum discounted stochastic games, Nash equilibrium, multi-agent reinforcement learning,
multi-timescale stochastic approximation.
1 Introduction
Traditional game theoretic developments have been for single-shot games where all agents participate and perform
their preferred actions, receive rewards and the game is over. However, several emerging applications have the
concept of multiple stages of action or most often the concept of time in them. One intermediate class of games
to handle multiple stages of decision is called repeated games. However, repeated games do not provide for
characterizing the influence of decisions made in one stage to future stages. Markov chains or Markov processes
are a popular and widely applicable class of random processes which are used for modeling practical systems.
Markov chains allow system designers to model states of a given system and then model the time behavior of
the system by connecting those states via suitable probabilities for transition from current state to a next state. A
popular extension to Markov chains which is used for modeling optimal control scenarios is the class of Markov
Decision Processes (MDPs). Here, in a given state, an action is allowed to be selected from a set of available
actions. Based on the choice of the action, a suitable reward/cost is obtained/incurred. Also, the action selected
influences the probabilities of transition from one state to another. Shapley [1953] merged these concepts of MDPs
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Figure 1: Multi-agent RL setting
(or basically Markov behavior) and games to come up with a new class of games called as stochastic games. In a
stochastic game, all participating agents select their actions, each of which influence the rewards received by all
agents as well as the transition probabilities. Since the inception of stochastic games by Shapley [1953], they have
been an important class of models for multi-agent systems. A comprehensive treatment of stochastic games under
various pay-off criteria is given by Filar and Vrieze [2004]. Many problems like fishery games, advertisement
games and several oligopolistic situations can be modelled as stochastic games citep breton1986computation,filar-
vrieze,olley1992dynamics,pakes1998empirical,pakes2001stochastic,bergemann1996learning.
We consider a finite stochastic game (also referred to as Markov game (cf. Littman [2001]) setting that evolves
over discrete time instants. As illustrated in Fig. 1, at each stage and in any given state x ∈ X , all agents act
simultaneously with an action vector a ∈ A(x) resulting in a transition to the next state y ∈ X according to the
transition probability p(y|x, a) as well as a reward vector r(x, a). No agent gets to know what the other agents’
actions are before selecting its own action and the reward ri(x, a) obtained by any agent i in each stage depends
on both system state x (common to all agents) and the aggregate action a (which includes other agents’ actions).
Each individual agent’s sole objective is maximization of his/her value function, i.e., the expected discounted sum
of rewards. However, the transition dynamics as well as the rewards depend on the actions of all agents and hence,
the dynamics of the game is coupled and not independent. We assume that r(x, a) and the action vector a are
made known to all agents after every agent i has picked his/her action ai - this is the canonical model-free setting1.
However, we do not assume that each agent knows the other agents’ policies, i.e., the distribution from which the
actions are picked.
The central concept of stability in a stochastic game is that of a Nash equilibrium. At a Nash equilibrium point
(with a corresponding Nash strategy), each agent plays a best-response strategy assuming all the other agents play
their equilibrium strategies (see Definition 2 for a precise statement). This notion of equilibrium makes perfect
sense in a game setting where agents do not have any incentive to unilaterally deviate from their Nash strategies.
Breton [1991], Filar and Vrieze [2004] establish that finding the stationary NE of a two-player discounted
stochastic game is equivalent to solving an optimization problem with a non-linear objective function and linear
constraints. We extend this formulation to general N -player stochastic games and observe that this generalization
causes the constraints to be non-linear as well. Previous approaches to solving the optimization problem have not
been able to guarantee convergence to global minima, even for the case of N = 2. In this light, our contribution is
significant as we develop an algorithm to find a global minimum for any N ≥ 2 via the following steps:2
Step 1 (Sub-problems): We break down the main optimization problem into several sub-problems. Each sub-
problem can be seen as ensuring no Bellman error, for a particular state x ∈ X and agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
1While the ON-SGSP algorithm that we propose is for this setting, we also propose another algorithm - OFF-SGSP - that is model based.
2A preliminary version of this paper, without the proofs, was published in AAMAS 2015 - see Prasad et al. [2015]. In comparison to the
conference version, this paper includes a more detailed problem formulation, formal proofs of convergence of the two proposed algorithms,
some additional experiments and a revised presentation.
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where X is the state space and N is the number of agents of the stochastic game considered.
Step 2 (Solution points): We provide a characterization of solution points that correspond to Nash equilibria of
the underlying game. As a result, we also derive a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, henceforth
referred to as SG-SP (Stochastic Game - Sub-Problem) conditions.
Step 3 (Descent direction): Using SG-SP conditions, we derive a descent direction that avoids local minima.
This is not a steepest descent direction, but a carefully chosen descent direction specific to this optimization
problem, which ensures convergence only to points of global minima that correspond to SG-SP points (and
hence Nash strategies).
Step 4 (Actor-critic algorithms): We propose algorithms that incorporate the aforementioned descent direction
to ensure convergence to stationary NE of the underlying game.
The algorithms that we propose are as follows:
OFF-SGSP. This is an offline, centralized and model-based scheme, i.e., it assumes that the transition structure
of the underlying game is known.
ON-SGSP. This is an online, model-free scheme that is decentralized, i.e., learning is localized to each agent with
one instance of ON-SGSP running on each agent. ON-SGSP only requires that other agents’ actions and
rewards are observed and not their policies, i.e., maps from states to actions.
We make the assumption that for all strategies, the resulting Markov chain is irreducible and positive recurrent. This
assumption is common to the analysis of previous multi-agent RL algorithms as well (cf. Hu and Wellman [1999],
Littman [2001])3. To the best of our knowledge, ON-SGSP is the first model-free online algorithm that converges
in self-play to stationary NE for any finite discounted general-sum stochastic game where the aforementioned
assumption holds.
As suggested by Bowling and Veloso [2001], two desirable properties of any multi-agent learning algorithm
are as follows:
(a) Rationality4: Learn to play optimally when other agents follow stationary strategies; and
(b) Self-play convergence: Converge to a Nash equilibrium assuming all agents are using the same learning algo-
rithm.
Our ON-SGSP algorithm can be seen to meet both the properties mentioned above. However, unlike the
repeated game setting of [Bowling and Veloso, 2001, Conitzer and Sandholm, 2007], ON-SGSP solves discounted
general-sum stochastic games and possesses theoretical convergence guarantees as well.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the basic idea in both OFF-SGSP and ON-SGSP is to employ two recursions, referred
to as the actor and the critic, respectively. Conceptually, these can be seen as two nested loops that operate as
follows:
Critic recursion: This performs policy evaluation, i.e., estimates the value function for a fixed policy. In the
model-based setting (i.e., of OFF-SGSP), this corresponds to the well-known dynamic programming proce-
dure - value iteration. On the other hand, in the model-free setting (i.e., of ON-SGSP), the critic is based on
temporal difference (TD) learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998].
Actor recursion: This incrementally updates the policy using gradient descent. For this purpose, it uses a descent
direction that ensures convergence to a global minimum (and hence NE) of the optimization problem we
mentioned earlier.
3 For the case of stochastic games where there are multiple communicating classes of states or even transient states, a possible work-around
is to re-start the game periodically in a random state.
4The term rationality is not to be confused with its common interpretation in economics parlance.
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Figure 2: Operational flow of our algorithms
Using multi-timescale stochastic approximation (see Chapter 6 of Borkar [2008]) both the recursions above are run
simultaneously, albeit with varying step-size parameters and this mimics the nested two-loop procedure outlined
above.
The formal proof of convergence requires considerable sophistication, as we base our approach on the ordinary
differential equations (ODE) method for stochastic approximation [Borkar, 2008]. While a few previous papers in
the literature have adopted this approach (cf. Akchurina [2009],Weibull [1996]), their results do not usually start
with an algorithm that is shown to track an ODE. Instead, an ODE is reached first via analysis and an approximate
method is used to solve this ODE. On the other hand, we adopt the former approach and show that both OFF-SGSP
and ON-SGSP converge using the following steps:
1. Using two-timescale stochastic approximation, we show that the value and policy updates on the fast and slow
timescales, converge respectively to the limit points of a system of ODEs.
2. Next, we provide a simplified representation for the limiting set of the policy ODE and use this to establish that
the asymptotically stable limit points of the policy ODE correspond to SG-SP (and hence Nash) points.
While the first step above uses a well-known result (Kushner-Clark lemma) for analysing stochastic approximation
recursions, the techniques used in the second step above are quite different from those used previously. The latter
step is crucial in establishing overall convergence, as the strategy π corresponding to each stable limit gives a
stationary NE of the underlying general-sum discounted stochastic game.
We demonstrate the practicality of our algorithms on two synthetic two-player setups. The first is a single state
non-generic game adopted from Hart and Mas-Colell [2005] that contains two NEs (one pure, the other mixed),
while the second is a stick-together game with 810, 000 states (to the best of our knowledge, previous works on
general-sum games have never considered state spaces of this size). On the first setup, we show that ON-SGSP
always converges to NE, while NashQ [Hu and Wellman, 2003] and FFQ [Littman, 2001] do not in a significant
number of experimental runs. On the second setup, we show that ON-SGSP outperforms NashQ and FFQ, while
exhibiting a relatively quick convergence rate - requiring approximately 21 iterations per state.
Map of the paper. Section 2 reviews relevant previous works in the literature. Section 3 formalizes a general-
sum stochastic game and sets the notation used throughout the paper. Section 4 formulates a general non-linear
optimization problem for solving stochastic games and also form sub-problems whose solutions correspond to
Nash strategies. Section 5 presents necessary and sufficient SG-SP conditions for Nash equilibria of general-
sum stochastic games. Section 6 presents the offline algorithm OFF-SGSP, while Section 7 provides its online
counterpart ON-SGSP. Section 8 sketches the proof of convergence for both the algorithms. Simulation results
for the single state non-generic game and the stick-together game settings are presented in Section 9. Finally,
concluding remarks are provided in Section 10.
4
2 Related Work
Various approaches have been proposed in the literature for computing Nash equilibrium of general-sum dis-
counted stochastic games and we discuss some of them below.
Multi-agent RL. Littman [Littman, 1994] proposed a minimax Q-learning algorithm for two-player zero-sum
stochastic games. Hu and Wellman [Hu and Wellman, 1999, 2003] extended the Q-learning approach to general-
sum games, but their algorithms do not provide meaningful convergence guarantees. Friend-or-foe Q-learning
(FFQ) [Littman, 2001] is a further improvement based on Q-learning and with guaranteed convergence. However,
FFQ converges to Nash equilibria only in restricted settings (See conditions A and B in [Littman, 2001]). Moreover,
the approaches in [Hu and Wellman, 1999, 2003] require computation of Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game, while
the approach of Littman [2001] requires solving a linear program, in each round of their algorithms and this is a
computationally expensive operation. In contrast, ON-SGSP does not require any such equilibria computations.
Zinkevich et al. [2006] show that the traditional Q-learning based approaches are not sufficient to compute Nash
equilibria in general-sum games5.
Policy hill climbing. This is a category of previous works that is closely related to ON-SGSP algorithm that we
propose. Important references here include Bowling and Veloso [2001], Bowling [2005], Conitzer and Sandholm
[2007] as well as Zhang and Lesser [2010]. All these algorithms are gradient-based, model-free and are proven
to converge to NE for stationary opponents in self-play. However, these convergence guarantees are for repeated
games only, i.e., the setting is a single state stochastic game, where the objective is to learn the Nash strategy for a
stage-game (see Definition 1 in [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2007]) that is repeatedly played. On the other hand, we
consider general-sum stochastic games where the objective is to learn the best-response strategy against stationary
opponents in order to maximize the value function (which is an infinite horizon discounted sum). Further, we work
with a more general state space that is not restricted to be a singleton.
Homotopy. Herings and Peeters [2004] propose an algorithm where a homotopic path between equilibrium
points of N independent MDPs and the N player stochastic game in question, is traced numerically. This, in turn,
gives a Nash equilibrium point of the stochastic game of interest. This approach is extended by Herings and Peeters
[2006] and Borkovsky et al. [2010]. OFF-SGSP shares similarities with the aforementioned homotopic algorithms
in the sense that both are
(i) offline and model-based as they assume complete information (esp. the transition dynamics) about the game;
and
(ii) the computational complexity for each iteration of both algorithms grows exponentially with the number of
agents N .
(iii) Further, both algorithms are proven to converge to stationary NE, though their approach adopted is vastly
different. OFF-SGSP is a gradient descent algorithm designed to converge to the global minimum of a
nonlinear program, while the algorithm by Herings and Peeters [2004] involves a tracing procedure to find
an equilibrium point.
Linear programming. Mac Dermed and Isbell [2009] solve stochastic games by formulating intermediate
optimization problems, called Multi-Objective Linear Programs (MOLPs). However, the solution concept there is
of correlated equilibria and Nash points are a strict subset of this class (and hence are harder to find). Also, the
complexity of their algorithm scales exponentially with the problem size.
Both homotopy and linear programming methods proposed by Mac Dermed and Isbell [2009] and Herings and Peeters
[2004] are tractable only for small-sized problems. The computational complexity of these algorithms may render
them infeasible on large state games. In contrast, ON-SGSP is a model-free algorithm with a per-iteration com-
plexity that is linear in N , allowing for practical implementations on large state game settings (see Section 9 for
one such example with a state space cardinality of 810, 000). We however mention that per-iteration complexity
alone is not sufficient to quantify the performance of an algorithm - see Remark 7.
5We avoid this impossibility result by searching for both values and policies instead of just values, in our proposed algorithms.
5
Rational learning. A popular algorithm with guaranteed convergence to Nash equilibria in general-sum
stochastic games is rational learning, proposed by Kalai and Lehrer [1993]. In their algorithm, each agent i main-
tains a prior on what he believes to be other agents’ strategy and updates it in a Bayesian manner. Combining
this with certain assumptions of absolute continuity and grain of truth, the algorithm there is shown to converge to
NE. ON-SGSP operates in a similar setting as that in [Kalai and Lehrer, 1993], except that we do not assume the
knowledge of reward functions. ON-SGSP is a model-free online algorithm and unlike [Kalai and Lehrer, 1993],
any agent’s strategy in ON-SGSP does not depend upon Bayesian estimates of other agents’ strategies and hence,
their absolute continuity/grain of truth assumptions do not apply.
Evolutionary algorithm. Akchurina [2009] employs numerical methods in order to solve a system of ODEs
and only establishes empirical convergence to NE for a group of randomly generated games. In contrast, ON-
SGSP is a model-free algorithm that is provably convergent to NE in self-play. We also note that the system of
ODEs given by Akchurina [2009] (also found in [Weibull, 1996, pp. 189]) turns out to be similar to a portion of
the ODEs that are tracked by ON-SGSP.
Remark 1. Shoham et al. [2003] and Shoham et al. [2007] question if Nash equilibrium is a useful solution con-
cept for general-sum games. However, if we are willing to concede that prescriptive, equilibrium agenda is indeed
useful for stochastic games, then we believe our work is theoretically significant. Our ON-SGSP algorithm is a
prescriptive, co-operative learning algorithm that observes a sample path from the underlying game and converges
to stationary NE. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to do so, with proven convergence.
3 Formal Definitions
A stochastic game can be seen to be an extension of the single-agent Markov decision process. A discounted reward
stochastic game is described by a tuple < N,X ,A, p, r, β >, where N represents the number of agents,X denotes
the state space and A = ∪x∈XA(x) is the aggregate action space, where A(x) =
N∏
i=1
Ai(x) is the Cartesian
product of action spaces (Ai(x)) of individual agents when the state of the game is x ∈ X . We assume both state
and action spaces to be finite. Let p(y|x, a) denote the probability of going from the current state x ∈ X to y ∈ X
when the vector of actions a ∈ A(x) (of the N players) is chosen and let r(x, a) = 〈ri(x, a) : i = 1, 2, . . . , N〉
denote the vector of reward functions of all agents when the state is x ∈ X and the vector of actions a ∈ A(x)
is chosen. Also, 0 < β < 1 denotes the discount factor that controls the influence of the rewards obtained in the
future on the agents’ strategy (see Definition 1 below).
Notation. 〈· · · 〉 represents a column vector and 1m is a vector of ones with m elements. The various constituents
of the stochastic game considered are denoted as follows:6
Action: a =
〈
a1, a2, . . . , aN
〉 ∈ A(x) is the aggregate action, a−i is the tuple of actions of all agents except i
andA−i(x) := ∏
j 6=i
Aj(x) is the set of feasible actions in state x ∈ X of all agents except i.
Policy: πi(x, ai) is the probability of picking action ai ∈ Ai(x) by agent i in state x ∈ X ,
πi(x) =
〈
πi(x, ai) : ai ∈ Ai(x)〉 is the randomized policy vector in state x ∈ X for the agent i, πi =〈
πi(x) : x ∈ X 〉, π = 〈πi : i = 1, 2, . . . , N〉 is the strategy-tuple of all agents and
π−i =
〈
πj : j = 1, 2, . . . , N, j 6= i〉 is the strategy-tuple of all agents except agent i. We focus only on
stationary strategies in this paper, as suggested by Theorem 1.
Transition Probability: Let π(x, a) =
N∏
i=1
πi(x, ai) and π−i(x, a−i) =
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
πj(x, aj). Then, the (Markovian)
transition probability from state x ∈ X to state y ∈ X when each agent i plays according to its randomized
6We use the terms policy and strategy interchangeably in the paper.
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strategy πi can be written as:
p(y|x, π) =
∑
a∈A(x)
p(y|x, a)π(x, a).
Reward: ri(x, a) is the single-stage reward obtained by agent i in state x ∈ X , where a ∈ A(x) is the aggregate
action taken.
Definition 1. (Value function) The value function is the expected return for any agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and is
defined as
vipi(s0) = E

∑
t
βt
∑
a∈A(x)
(
ri(st, a)π(st, a)
) . (1)
Given the above notion of the value function, the goal of each agent is to find a strategy that achieves a Nash
equilibrium. The latter is defined as follows:
Definition 2. (Nash Equilibrium) A stationary Markov strategy π∗ = 〈π1∗, π2∗, . . . , πN∗〉 is said to be Nash if
vipi∗(s) ≥ vi〈pii,pi−i∗〉(s), ∀πi, ∀i, ∀s ∈ X .
The corresponding equilibrium of the game is said to be Nash equilibrium.
Since we consider a discounted stochastic game with a finite state space, we have the following well-known
result that ensures the existence of stationary equilibrium:
Theorem 1. Any finite discounted stochastic game has an equilibrium in stationary strategies.
We shall refer to such stationary randomized strategies as Nash strategies. The reader is referred to Fink [1964],
Takahashi [1964], Sobel [1971] for a proof of Theorem 1.
4 A Generalized Optimization Problem
Basic idea. Using dynamic programming the Nash equilibrium condition in Definition 2 can be re-written as:
∀x ∈ X , ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
vipi∗(x) = max
pii(x)∈∆(Ai(x))
{
Epii(x)Q
i
pi−i∗(x, a
i)
}
, (2)
where
Qipi−i(x, a
i) = Epi−i(x)

ri(x, a) + β ∑
y∈U(x)
p(y|x, a)vi(y)

 ,
represents the marginal value associated with picking action ai ∈ Ai(x), in state x ∈ X for agent i, while other
agents act according to π−i. Also, ∆(Ai(x)) denotes the set of all possible probability distributions overAi(x).
The basic idea behind the optimization problem that we formulate below is to model the objective such that the
value function is correct w.r.t. the agents’ strategies, while adding a constraint to ensure that a feasible solution to
the problem corresponds to Nash equilibrium.
Objective. A possible optimization objective for agent i would be
f i(vi, π) =
∑
x∈X
(
vi(x) − EpiiQipi−i(x, ai)
)
.
The objective above has to be minimized over all policies πi ∈ ∆(Ai(x)). But Qi
pi−i
(x, ai), by definition, is
dependent on strategies of all other agents. So, an isolated minimization of f i(vi, πi) would not be meaningful
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and hence, we consider the aggregate objective f(v, π) =
N∑
i=1
f i(vi, π). This objective is minimized over all
policies πi ∈ ∆(Ai(x)) of all agents. Thus, we have an optimization problem with objective as f(v, π) along
with the natural constraints ensuring that the policy vectors πi(x) remain as probabilities over all feasible actions
Ai(x) in all states x ∈ X and for agents i = 1, . . . , N .
Constraints. Notice that an optimization problem with the objective discussed above has only a set of simple
constraints ensuring that π remains a valid strategy. However, this is not sufficient to accurately represent Nash
equilibria of the underlying game. Here, we look at a possible set of additional constraints which might make
the optimization problem more useful. Note that the term being maximized in equation (2), i.e., EpiiQipi−i(x, ai),
represents a convex combination of the values of Qi
pi−i
(x, ai) over all possible actions ai ∈ Ai(x) in a given state
x ∈ X for a given agent i. Thus, it is implicitly implied that
Qipi−i(x, a
i) ≤ vipi∗(x), ∀ai ∈ Ai(x), x ∈ X , i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Formally, the optimization problem for any N ≥ 2 is given below:
min
v,pi
f(v, π) =
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈X
(
vi(x) − EpiiQipi−i(x, ai)
)
s.t.
(a)πi(x, ai) ≥ 0, ∀ai ∈ Ai(x), x ∈ X , i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
(b)
N∑
i=1
πi(x, ai) = 1, ∀x ∈ X , i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
(c)Qi
pi−i
(x, ai) ≤ vi(x), ∀ai ∈ Ai(x), x ∈ X , i = 1, 2, . . . , N.


(3)
In the above, 3(a)–3(b) ensure that π is a valid policy, while 3(c) is necessary for any valid policy to be a NE of the
underlying game.
Theorem 2. A feasible point (v∗, π∗) of the optimization problem (3) provides a Nash equilibrium in stationary
strategies to the corresponding general-sum discounted stochastic game if and only if f(v∗, π∗) = 0.
Proof. See [Filar and Vrieze, 2004, Theorem 3.8.2] for a proof in the case of N = 2. The proof works in a similar
manner for general N .
A few remarks about the difficulties involved in solving (3) are in order.
Remark 2. (Non-linearity) For the case of N = 2, the objective f(v, π) in (3) is of order 3, while the toughest
constraint 3(c) is quadratic. This is apparent from the fact that the second term inside the summation in f(v, π)
has the following variables multiplied: π1 in the first expectation, π2 inside the expectation in the definition of the
Q-function and v inside the second term of the expectation in Q-function. Along similar lines, the constraint 3(c)
can be inferred to be quadratic. Thus, we have an optimization problem with a third-order objective and quadratic
constraints, even for the case of N = 2 and the constituent functions (both objective and constraints) can be easily
seen to be non-linear. For a general N > 2, the problem (3) gets more complicated, as more policy variables
π1, . . . , πN are thrown in.
Remark 3. (Beyond local minima) Filar and Vrieze [2004] have formulated a non-linear optimization prob-
lem for the case of two-player zero-sum stochastic games. An associated result (Theorem 3.9.4, page 141, in
[Filar and Vrieze, 2004]) states that every local minimum of that optimization problem is also a global minimum.
However, this result does not hold for a general-sum game even in the two-player (and also N ≥ 3) setting and
hence, the requirement is for a global optimization scheme that solves (3).
Remark 4. (No steepest descent) From the previous remark, it is apparent that a simple steepest descent scheme
is not enough to solve (3) even for the two-player setting. This is because there can be local minima of (3) that do
not correspond to the global minimum and steepest descent schemes guarantee convergence to local minima only.
Note that steepest descent schemes were sufficient to solve for Nash equilibrium strategies in two-player zero-sum
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stochastic games, while this is not the case with general-sum N -player games, with N ≥ 2. Sections 3 and 4 of
[Prasad and Bhatnagar, 2015] contain a detailed discussion on inadequacies of steepest descent for general-sum
games.
Remark 5. (No Newton method) A natural question that arises is can one employ a Newton method in order to
solve (3) and the answer is in the negative. Observe that the Hessian of the objective function f(v, π) in (3) has
its diagonal elements to be zero and this makes it indefinite. This make Newton methods infeasible as they require
invertibility of the Hessian to work.
We overcome the above difficulties by deriving a descent direction (that is not necessarily steepest) in order to
solve (3). Before we present the descent direction, we break-down (3) into simpler sub-problems. Subsequently we
descibe Stochastic Game - Sub-Problem (SG-SP) conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for the problem
(3).
Sub-problems for each state and agent
We form sub-problems from the main optimization problem (3) along the lines of Prasad and Bhatnagar [2012], for
each state x ∈ X and each agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. The sub-problems are formed with the objective of ensuring
that there is no Bellman error (see gix,z(θ) below). For any x ∈ X , z = 1, 2, . . . , |Ai(x)| and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
let θ :=
〈
vi, π−i(x)
〉
denote the value-policy tuple and let
gix,z(θ) := Q
i
pi−i(x, a
i
z)− vi(x) (4)
denote the Bellman error. Further, let pz := πi(x, aiz) and p =
〈
pz : z = 1, 2, . . . , |Ai(x)|
〉
. Then, the sub-
problems are formulated as follows:
min
θ,p
hx(θ, p) =
|Ai(x)|∑
z=1
pz
[−gix,z(θ)] (5)
s.t. gix,z(θ) ≤ 0,−pz ≤ 0, for z = 1, 2, . . . , |Ai(x)|,
and
∑
z
pz = 1.
5 Stochastic Game - Sub-Problem (SG-SP) Conditions
In this section, we derive a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for solutions of (3) and establish their equiv-
alence with Nash strategies.
Definition 3 (SG-SP Point). A point (v∗, π∗) of the optimization problem (3) is said to be an SG-SP point if it is
a feasible point of (3) and for every sub-problem, i.e., for all x ∈ X and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
p∗zg
i
x,z(θ
∗) = 0, ∀z = 1, 2, . . . , |Ai(x)|. (6)
The above conditions, which define a point to be an SG-SP point, are called SG-SP conditions.
5.1 Equivalence of SG-SP with Nash strategies
The connection between SG-SP points and Nash equilibria can be seen intuitively as follows:
(i) The objective function f(v∗, π∗) in (3) can be expressed as a summation of terms of the form p∗z[−gix,z(θ∗)]
over z = 1, 2, . . . , |Ai(x)| and over all sub-problems. Condition (6) suggests that each of these terms is zero which
implies f(v∗, π∗) = 0.
(ii) The objective of the sub-problem is to ensure that there is no Bellman error, which in turn implies that the value
estimates v∗ are correct with respect to the policy π∗ of all agents.
Combining (i) and (ii) with Theorem 3.8.2 of [Filar and Vrieze, 2004], we have the following result:
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Theorem 3 (Nash ⇔ SG-SP). A strategy π∗ is Nash if and only if (v∗, π∗) for the corresponding optimization
problem (3) is an SG-SP point.
The proof of the above theorem follows from a combination of Lemmas 1 and 2, presented below.
Lemma 1 (SG-SP ⇒ Nash). An SG-SP point (v∗, π∗) gives Nash strategy-tuple for the underlying stochastic
game.
Proof. The objective function value f(v∗, π∗) of the optimization problem (3) can be expressed as a summation of
terms of the form p∗z[−gix,z(θ∗)] over z = 1, 2, . . . ,m and over all sub-problems. Condition (6) suggests that each
of these terms is zero which implies f(v∗, π∗) = 0. From Filar and Vrieze [2004, Theorem 3.8.2, page 132], since
(v∗, π∗) is a feasible point of (3) and f(v∗, π∗) = 0, (v∗, π∗) corresponds to Nash equilibrium of the underlying
stochastic game.
Lemma 2 (Nash ⇒ SG-SP). A strategy π∗ is Nash if (v∗, π∗) for the corresponding optimization problem (3) is
an SG-SP point.
Proof. From Filar and Vrieze [2004, Theorem 3.8.2, page 132], if a strategy π∗ is Nash, then a feasible point
(v∗, π∗) exists for the corresponding optimization problem (3), where f(v∗, π∗) = 0. From the constraints of (3),
it is clear that for a feasible point, p∗z[−gix,z(θ∗)] ≥ 0, for z = 1, 2, . . . ,m, for every sub-problem. Since the sum
of all these terms, i.e., f(v∗, π∗), is zero, each of these terms is zero, i.e., (v∗, π∗) satisfies (6). Thus, (v∗, π∗) is
an SG-SP point.
5.2 Kinship to Karush-Kuhn-Tucker - Sub-Problem (KKT-SP) conditions
Prasad and Bhatnagar [2012] consider a similar optimization problem as (3) for the case of two agents, i.e., N = 2
and derive a set of verifiable necessary and sufficient conditions that they call KKT-SP conditions. In the following,
we first extend the KKT-SP conditions to N -player stochastic games, for any N ≥ 2 and later establish the
equivalence between KKT-SP conditions with the SG-SP conditions formulated above.
The Lagrangian corresponding to (5) can be written as
k(θ, p, λ, δ, s, t) =hx(θ, p) +
|Ai(x)|∑
z=1
λz
(
gix,z(θ) + s
2
z
)
+
|Ai(x)|∑
z=1
δz
(−pz + t2z) , (7)
where λz and δz are the Lagrange multipliers and sz and tz, z = 1, 2, . . . , |Ai(x)| are the slack variables, corre-
sponding to the first and second constraints of the sub-problem (5), respectively.
Using the Lagrangian (7), the associated KKT conditions for the sub-problem (5) corresponding to a state
x ∈ S and agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N} at a point 〈θ∗, p∗〉 are the following:
(a)∇θhx(θ∗, p∗) +
m∑
z=1
λz∇θgix,z(θ∗) = 0,
(b)
∂hx(θ
∗, p∗)
∂pz
− δz + δm = 0, z = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
(c) δzp
∗
z = 0, z = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
(d)λzg
i
x,z(θ
∗) = 0, z = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
(e)λz ≥ 0, z = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
(f) δz ≥ 0, z = 1, 2, . . . ,m.


(8)
KKT-SP conditions are shown to be necessary and sufficient for (v∗, π∗) to represent a Nash equilibrium point
of the underlying stochastic game and π∗ to be a Nash strategy-tuple in the case of N = 2 (see Theorem 3.8
in [Prasad and Bhatnagar, 2012]). However, this requires an additional assumption that for each sub-problem,
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{∇θgix,z(θ∗) : z = 1, 2, . . . ,m} is a set of linearly independent vectors. On the other hand, the SG-SP conditions
(see Definition 3) that we formulate do not impose any additional linear independence requirement, in order to
ensure that the solution points of the sub-problems correspond to Nash equilibria.
The following lemma establishes the kinship between SG-SP and KKT-SP conditions.
Lemma 3 (KKT-SP ⇒ SG-SP). A KKT-SP point is also an SG-SP point.
Proof. A KKT-SP point (v∗, π∗) is a feasible point of (3). For every sub-problem, substitute and eliminate λ∗z = p∗z
and δ∗z = −gix,z(θ∗), z = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Then
1. Conditions (8(a)) and (8(b)) are satisfied;
2. Conditions (8(c)) and (8(d)) reduce to (6); and
3. Conditions (8(e)) and (8(f)) are satisfied as the point (v∗, π∗) is assumed to be feasible.
From the above, it is evident that the simpler and more general (for any N ) SG-SP conditions can be used for
Nash equilibria as compared to KKT-SP conditions because:
(i) every KKT-SP point is also an SG-SP point and
(ii) SG-SP conditions do not impose any additional linear independence requirement in order to be Nash points.
6 OFF-SGSP: Offline, Model-Based
Basic idea. As outlined in the introduction, OFF-SGSP is an actor-critic algorithm that operates using two
timescale recursions as follows
Critic recursion: This estimates the value function v using value iteration, along the faster timescale; and
Actor recursion: This operates along the slower timescale and updates the policy in the descent direction so as to
ensure convergence to an SG-SP point.
As mentioned before, OFF-SGSP is a model-based algorithm and the transition dynamics and reward structure of
the underlying game are used for both steps above.
Update rule. Using two timescale recursions, OFF-SGSP updates the value-policy tuple (v, π) as follows: For
all x ∈ X and ai ∈ Ai(x),
Actor: πin+1(x, ai) = Γ
(
πin(x, a
i)− b(n)
√
πin(x, a
i)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vin, π−in )∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vn, πn)
∂πi
))
, (9)
Critic: vin+1(x)=vin(x) + c(n)
∑
ai∈Ai(x)
πin(x, a
i)gix,ai(v
i
n, π
−i
n ), (10)
where gi
x,ai
(vi, π−i) := Qi
pi−i
(x, ai) − vi(x) denotes the Bellman error, f(v, π) is the objective function in (3)
and Γ is a projection operator that ensures that the updates to π stay within the simplex D = {(d2, . . . , d|Ai(x)|) |
di ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , |Ai(x)|,
|Ai(x)|∑
j=2
dj ≤ 1}. Further, using Γ, one ensures that d1 = 1 −
∑|Ai(x)|
j=2 , dj ∈ [0, 1].
Here sgn(·) is a continuous version of the sign function and projects any x, outside of a very small interval around
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0, to ±1 according to the sign of x (see Remark 10 for a precise definition). Continuity of sgn(·) is a technical
requirement that helps in providing strong convergence guarantees7.
The following assumption on the step-sizes ensures that the π-recursion (9) proceeds on a slower timescale in
comparison to the v-recursion (10):
Assumption 1. The step-sizes {b(n)}, {c(n)} satisfy
∞∑
n=1
b(n)=
∞∑
n=1
c(n)=∞,
∞∑
n=1
(
b2(n) + c2(n)
)
<∞, b(n)
c(n)
→ 0.
Justification for descent direction. The following proposition proves that the decrement for the policy in (9) is
a valid descent direction for the objective function f(·, ·) in (3).
Proposition 1. For each i = 1, 2, . . . , N, x ∈ X , ai ∈ Ai(x), we have that
−
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vi, π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(v, π)
∂πi
)
is a non-ascent, and in particular a descent direction
if √πi(x, ai) ∣∣∣gix,ai(vi, π−i)∣∣∣ 6= 0, in the objective f(v, π) of (3).
Proof. The objective f(v, π) can be rewritten as
f(v, π) =
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈X
∑
ai∈Ai(x)
{
πi(x, ai)
[
−gix,ai(vi, π−i)
]}
.
Assume f(v, π) > 0, otherwise the solution to (3) is already achieved. For an ai ∈ Ai(x) for some x ∈ X and
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, let
pˆi
i(x, ai)=pii(x, ai)− δ
√
pii(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vi, pi−i)
∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(v, pi)
∂pii
)
,
for a small δ > 0. Let πˆ be the same as π except that action ai is picked as defined above. Then by a Taylor series
expansion of f(v, πˆ) till the first order term, we obtain
f(v, πˆ) = f(v, π) + δ
[
−
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vi, π−i)∣∣∣] sgn
(
∂f(v, π)
∂πi
)
∂f(v, π)
∂πi(x, ai)
+ o(δ).
The rest of the proof amounts to showing that the second term in the expansion above is ≤ 0. This can be inferred
as follows:
−
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vi, π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(v, π)
∂πi
)
∂f(v, π)
∂πi
=−
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vi, π−i)∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∂f(v, π)∂πi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 0,
and is in particular < 0 if
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vi, π−i)∣∣∣ 6= 0.
Thus, for ai ∈ Ai(x), x ∈ X and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} where πi(x, ai) > 0 and gi
x,ai
(vi, π−i) 6= 0, f(v, πˆ) <
f(v, π) for small enough δ. The claim follows.
7 Using the normal sgn() function is problematic for an ODE approach based analysis, as sgn() is discontinuous. In other words, with
sgn() the underlying system for the policy piin will be a stochastic recursive inclusion and providing meaningful guarantees for such inclusions
would require more assumptions. In comparison, the results are stronger for the ODE approach. This is the motivation behind employing
sgn(), which is a continuous extension of sgn(). The function sgn(x) projects any x outside of a small interval around 0 (say [−ν, ν] for some
ν > 0 small) to either +1 or −1 as sgn() would do and within the interval [−ν, ν], one may choose sgn(x) = x or any other continuous
function with compatible end-point values. One could choose ν arbitrarily close to 0, making sgn practically very close to sgn.
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Figure 3: ON-SGSP’s decentralized on-line learning model with N agents
Main result. Let Ripi =
〈
ri(x, π), x ∈ X 〉 be a column vector of rewards to agent i and Ppi = [p(y|x, π), x ∈
X , y ∈ X ] be the transition probability matrix, both for a given π. Then, the value function for a given policy π is
defined as
vipi = [I − βPpi ]−1Ripi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (11)
The above will be used to characterize the limit of the critic-recursion (10). Before presenting the main result, we
specify the ODE that underlies the actor-recursion (9): For all ai ∈ Ai(x), x ∈ X , i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
dπi(x, ai)
dt
= Γ¯
(
−
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vipi, π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vpi, π)
∂πi
))
, (12)
where Γ¯ is a projection operator that restricts the evolution of the above ODE to the simplex D (see Section 8 for
a precise definition).
The main result regarding the convergence of OFF-SGSP is as follows:
Theorem 4. Let G denote the set of all feasible points of the optimization problem (3) and K the set of limit points
of the ODE (12). Further, let K1 = K ∩ G and K∗ = {(vipi∗ , π∗) | π∗ ∈ K1}. Then, for any agent i = 1, . . . , N ,
the sequence of iterates (vin, πin), n ≥ 0 satisfy
(vin, π
i
n)→ K∗ a.s.
Proof. See Section 8.1.
From the above theorem, we can infer the following:
(i) The set of infeasible limit points of the ODE (12), i.e., K2 = K \ K1, are asymptotically unstable (see
Lemma 5 in Section 8 for a formal proof); and
(ii) OFF-SGSP converges to the set K∗, which is the set of all asymptotically stable limit points of the system of
ODEs (19). Further, K∗ corresponds to SG-SP (and hence Nash) points and hence, OFF-SGSP is shown to
converge almost surely to a NE of the underlying discounted stochastic game.
7 ON-SGSP: Online and Model-Free
Though OFF-SGSP is suitable for only off-line learning of Nash strategies, it is amenable for extension to the
general (on-line) multi-agent RL setting where neither the transition probability p nor the reward function r are
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explicitly known. ON-SGSP operates in the latter model-free setting and uses the stochastic game as a generative
model.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, every iteration in ON-SGSP represents a discrete-time interaction with the environment,
where each agent presents its action to the environment and observes the next state and the reward vector of all
agents. The learning is localized to each agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, making the setting decentralized. This is in
the spirit of earlier multi-agent RL approaches (cf. Hu and Wellman [1999], Hu and Wellman [2003] and Littman
[2001]).
Algorithm 1 presents the complete structure of ON-SGSP along with update rules for the value and policy
parameters. The algorithm operates along two timescales as follows:
Critic (faster timescale): Each agent estimates its own value function as well as that of other agents, using a
temporal-difference (TD) [Sutton, 1988] type update in (13). Moreover, the gradient ∂f(vn, πn)
∂πi(x, ai)
is also
estimated in an online manner via the ξ-recursion in (14). Note that the ξ-recursion is made necessary due
to the fact that ON-SGSP operates in a model-free setting.
Actor (slower timescale): The policy update is similar to OFF-SGSP, except that the estimates of value v and
gradient ξ are used to derive the decrement in (15).
Note that, since ON-SGSP operates in a model-free setting, both the value and policy updates are different in
comparison to OFF-SGSP. The value v update (13) on the faster timescale can be seen to be the stochastic approx-
imation variant of value iteration and it converges to the same limit as in OFF-SGSP, without knowing the model.
On the other hand, the policy update (15) on the slower timescale involves a decrement that is motivated by the
descent direction suggested by Proposition 1.
Algorithm 1 ON-SGSP
Input: Starting state x0, initial point θi0 = (vi0, πi0), step-sizes {b(n), c(n)}n≥1, number of iterations to run
M >> 0.
Initialization: n← 1, θi ← θi0, x← x0
for n = 1, . . . ,M do
Play action ain := πin(xn) along with other agents in current state xn ∈ X
Obtain next state yn ∈ X
Observe reward vector rn =< r1n, . . . , rNn >
Value Update: For j = 1, . . . , N
vjn+1(xn)=v
j
n(xn)+c(n)
(
rjn+βv
j
n(yn)−vjn(xn)
) (13)
Gradient Estimation:
ξin+1(xn, a
i
n) = ξ
i
n(xn, a
i
n) + c(n)
( N∑
j=1
(
rjn + βv
j
n(yn)− vjn(xn)
)− ξin(xn, ain)
)
(14)
Policy Update:
πin+1(xn, a
i
n) = Γ(π
i
n(xn, a
i
n)− b(n)
√
πin(xn, a
i
n)
× ∣∣rin + βvin(yn)− vin(xn)∣∣ sgn(−ξin+1(xn, ain))) (15)
end for
A few remarks about ON-SGSP are in order.
Remark 6. (Coupled dynamics) In the ON-SGSP algorithm, an agent i observes the rewards of other agents and
uses this information to compute the respective value estimates. These quantities are then used to derive the decre-
ment in the policy update (15). This is meaningful in the light of the impossibility result of Hart and Mas-Colell
[2003], where the authors show that in order to converge to a Nash equilibrium each agent’s strategy needs to
factor in the rewards of the other agents.
14
Remark 7. (Per-iteration complexity)
OFF-SGSP: Let A be the typical number of actions available to any agent in any given state and let U be the
typical number of next states for any state x ∈ X . Then, the typical number of multiplications in OFF-SGSP
per iteration is N × ((U + 1)×AN + 4A)×|X |. Thus, the computational complexity grows exponentially
in terms of the number of agents while being linear in the size of the state space. Note that the exponential
behaviour in N appears because of the computation of expectation over possible next states and strategies
of agents. This computation is avoided in ON-SGSP.
ON-SGSP: For each agent, a typical iteration would take just (2A+ 1) number of multiplications.
Thus, per-iteration complexity of OFF-SGSP is Θ(2N ) while that of ON-SGSP is Θ(1) (from the point of view of
each agent). Thus, ON-SGSP is computationally efficient and this is also confirmed by simulation results, which
establish that the total run-time till convergence of ON-SGSP is indeed very small when compared to that of the
off-line algorithm OFF-SGSP. In comparison, the stochastic tracing procedure of Herings and Peeters [2004] has
a complexity of O(|X | ×AN ) per iteration which is similar to that of OFF-SGSP.
However, the per-iteration complexity alone is not sufficient and an analysis of the number of iterations required
is necessary to complete the picture8. On the other hand, convergence rate results for general multi-timescale
stochastic approximation schemes are not available, see however, Konda and Tsitsiklis [2004] for rate results of
two timescale schemes with linear recursions.
Remark 8. (Descent directions) It is shown in Proposition 1 that
−
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vi, π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(v, π)
∂πi
)
is a descent direction in πi(x, ai) for every i = 1, 2, . . . , N, x ∈
X , ai ∈ Ai(x). Since {πi(x, ai)}α ≥ 0 for any α ≥ 0,
−{πi(x, ai)}α√πi(x, ai) ∣∣∣gix,ai(vi, π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(v, π)
∂πi
)
can also be seen to be a descent direction in πi(x, ai) for every i = 1, 2, . . . , N, x ∈ X , ai ∈ Ai(x). In other
words, the following is a descent direction in πi(x, ai) for every i = 1, 2, . . . , N, x ∈ X , ai ∈ Ai(x):
−{πi(x, ai)}α′ ∣∣∣gix,ai(vi, π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(v, π)
∂πi
)
, for any α′ ≥ 1
2
So, the policy updates in OFF-SGSP/ON-SGSP can be generalized as follows: With α ≥ 12 ,
OFF-SGSP: πi(x, ai)← Γ
(
πi(x, ai)− γ {πi(x, ai)}α′ ∣∣∣gix,ai(vi, π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(v, π)
∂πi
))
,
ON-SGSP: πi(x, ai)← Γ
(
πi(x, ai)− γ {πi(x, ai)}α′ ∣∣ri + βvi(y)− vi(x)∣∣ sgn(qi(x, ai)) ,
where γ is a step-size parameter.
Remark 9. (Convergence result) Theorem 4 holds for ON-SGSP as well, while the proof deviates significantly.
OFF-SGSP assumes model information, i.e., knowledge of transition dynamics. On the other hand, ON-SGSP op-
erates in a model-free setting and hence, the analyses for both the timescales change. In particular, ON-SGSP uses
a TD-critic and using standard stochastic approximation arguments (as in earlier literature), it is straightforward
to prove the value updates in (13) converge to the true value function. However, the analysis of the ξ-recursion
changes significantly. The latter is a consequence of the fact that ON-SGSP operates in a model-free setting and
hence does not have access to f(vn, πn) (and hence ∂f(vn, πn)
∂πi(x, ai)
which is required for the policy update). Finally,
the policy updates can be shown to track the system of ODEs (19) as in OFF-SGSP, after handling an additional
martingale sequence that arises due to the ξ-recursion. The detailed proof is available in Section 8.2.
8A well-known complexity result [Papadimitriou, 1994] establishes that finding the Nash equilibrium of a two-player game is PPAD-
complete.
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8 Proof of Convergence
We provide a proof of convergence of the two proposed algorithms - OFF-SGSP and ON-SGSP, respectively. In
addition to Assumption 1, we make the following assumption for the analysis of our algorithms:
Assumption 2. The underlying Markov chain with transition probabilities p(y|x, π), x, y ∈ X , corresponding to
the general-sum discounted stochastic game, is irreducible and positive recurrent for all possible strategies π.
The above assumption is standard in the analysis of multi-agent RL algorithms and can be seen in earlier works
as well (for instance, see Hu and Wellman [1999], Littman [2001]).
In the following section, we provide the detailed analysis for OFF-SGSP and later, in Section 8.2, provide the
necessary modifications to the analysis for ON-SGSP.
8.1 Proof of Theorem 4 for OFF-SGSP
As mentioned earlier, OFF-SGSP employs two time-scale stochastic approximation [Borkar, 2008, Chapter 6].
That is, it comprises of iteration sequences that are updated using two different time-scales or step-size schedules
defined via {b(n)} and {c(n)}, respectively. The step-sizes, satisfying Assumption 1, ensure the following:
(i) The policy π (on slower timescale) appears quasi-static for updates of v; and
(ii) The value v (on faster timescale) appears almost equilibrated for updates of π. We let vpi denote the value
for a given policy π.
Claim (i) above can be inferred as follows: First rewrite the π-recursion in (9) as
πin+1(x, a
i) = Γ
(
πin(x, a
i)− c(n)H(n)) ,
where H(n) = b(n)
c(n)
√
πin(x, a
i)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vin, π−in )∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vn, πn)
∂πi
)
, with gi(·, ·) as defined in (4) and f(·, ·) as
defined in (3). Since we consider a finite state-action spaced stochastic game, gi
x,ai
is bounded, while one can
trivially upper bound π and sgn. Thus, supn |H(n)| is finite. Since, b(n)c(n) = o(1) by assumption 1, it can be clearly
seen that the π-recursion in (9) tracks the ODE
dπi(x, ai)
dt
= 0.
Claim (i) now follows.
Inferring claim (ii) above is technically more involved, but follows using arguments similar to those used in
Theorem 2 of Chapter 6 in [Borkar, 2008].
In order to prove Theorem 4, we analyse each timescale separately in the following.
Step 1: Analysis of v-recursion
We first show that the updates of v, that are on the faster time-scale, converge to a limit point of the following
system of ODEs:∀x ∈ X , i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
dvi(x)
dt
= ri(x, π) + β
∑
y∈U(x)
p(y|x, π)vi(y)− vi(x), (16)
where π is assumed to be time-invariant. We will also see that the system of ODEs above has a unique limit point,
henceforth referred to as vpi , which is stable.
Let Ripi =
〈
ri(x, π), x ∈ X 〉 be a column vector of rewards to agent i and Ppi = [p(y|x, π), x ∈ X , y ∈ X ] be
the transition probability matrix, both for a given π.
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Lemma 4. The system of ODEs (16) has a unique globally asymptotically stable limit point given by
vipi = [I − βPpi ]−1Ripi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (17)
Proof. The system of ODEs (16) can be re-written in vector form as given below.
dvi
dt
= Ripi + βPpiv
i − vi. (18)
Rearranging terms, we get
dvi
dt
= Ripi + (βPpi − I)vi,
where I is the identity matrix of suitable dimension. Note that for a fixed π, this ODE is linear in vi with state
transition matrix as (βPpi − I). Since Ppi is a stochastic matrix, the magnitude of all its eigen-values is upper
bounded by 1. Hence all the eigen-values of the state transition matrix (βPpi − I) have negative real parts and
the matrix (βPpi − I) is in particular non-singular. Thus by standard linear systems theory, the above ODE has a
unique globally asymptotically stable limit point which can be computed by setting dv
i
dt
= 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , i.e.,
Ripi + (βPpi − I)vi = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
The trajectories of the ODE (18) converge to the above point starting from any initial condition in lieu of the
above.
For a given π, the updates of v in equation (10) (OFF-SGSP) can be seen as Euler discretization of the system
of ODEs (16). We now show that vn in equation (10) of OFF-SGSP converges to vpi as given in equation (17).
While the following claim is identical for both OFF-SGSP/ON-SGSP, the proofs are quite different. In the former
case, it amounts to proving value iteration converges (a standard result in dynamic programming), while the latter
case amounts to proving a stochastic approximation variant of value iteration converges (also a standard result in
RL).
Proposition 2. For a given π, i.e., with πin ≡ πi, updates of v governed by (10) (OFF-SGSP) satisfy vn → vpi ,
as n→∞, where vpi is the globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point of the system of ODEs (16).
Proof. We verify here assumptions (A1) and (A2) of Borkar and Meyn [2000] in order to use their result [Borkar and Meyn,
2000, Theorem 2.2]. Let h(vi) = Ripi + (βPpi − I)vi. Since h(vi) is linear in vi, it is Lipschitz continuous. Let
hr(v
i) = h(rv
i)
r
for a scalar real number, r > 0. It is easy to see that hr(vi) = R
i
pi
r
+ (βPpi − I)vi. Now,
h∞(v
i) = lim
r→∞
hr(v
i) = (βPpi − I)vi. Now since all eigenvalues of (βPpi − I) have negative real parts, the
ODE dv
i
dt
= h∞(v
i) has the origin as its unique globally asymptotically stable equilibrium. Further, as shown
in Lemma 4, vipi is the unique globally asymptotically stable equilibrium for the ODE (18). Assumption (A1) of
Borkar and Meyn [2000] is thus satisfied. Since the updates of v in equation (10) do not have any noise term in
them, assumption (A2) of citet borkar2000ode is trivially satisfied. Thus by Borkar and Meyn [2000, Theorem
2.2], vn in equation (10) converges to the globally asymptotically stable limit point vpi given in equation (17).
Thus, on the faster time-scale {c(n)}, the updates of v obtained from (10) converge to vpi , as given by (17).
Step 2: Analysis of pi-recursion
Using the converged values of v corresponding to strategy update πn, i.e., vpin on the slower time-scale, we show
that updates of π converge to a limit point of the following system of ODEs:
For all ai ∈ Ai(x), x ∈ X , i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
dπi(x, ai)
dt
= Γ¯
(
−
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vipi, π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vpi, π)
∂πi
))
, (19)
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where gi
x,ai
(·, ·) is the Bellman error (see (4)), f(·, ·) is the objective in (3) and Γ¯ is a projection operator that
restricts the evolution of the above ODE to the simplex D and is defined as follows:
Γ¯(v(x)) = lim
η→0
(
Γ(x+ ηv(x)) − x
η
)
, (20)
for any continuous v : D → RN .
Let K denote the limit set of the ODE (19). Before we analyse the π-recursion in (9), we show that the points
in K that are infeasible for the optimization problem (3) are asymptotically unstable. In other words, each stable
limit point of the ODE (19) is an SG-SP point.
Define the set of all feasible points of the optimization problem (3) as follows:
G =
{
π ∈ L
∣∣∣∣gix,ai(vipi , π−i) ≤ 0, ∀ai ∈ Ai(x), x ∈ X , i = 1, 2, . . . , N
}
(21)
The limit set K of the ODE (19) can be partitioned using the feasible set G as K = K1 ∪K2 where K1 = K ∩G
and K2 = K \ K1. In the following lemma, we show that the set K2 is the set of locally unstable equilibrium
points of (19).
Lemma 5. All π∗ ∈ K2 are unstable equilibrium points of the system of ODEs (19).
Proof. For any π∗ ∈ K2, there exists some ai ∈ Ai(x), x ∈ X , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, such that gix,ai(vipi , π−i) > 0
and πi(x, ai) = 0 because K2 is not in the feasible set G. Let Bδ(π∗) = {π ∈ L| ‖π − π∗‖ < δ}. Choose δ > 0
such that gi
x,ai
(vipi, π
−i) > 0 for all π ∈ Bδ(π∗) \K and consequently ∂f(vpi, π)
∂πi
< 0.
So, Γ¯
(
−
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vipi , π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vpi, π)
∂πi
))
> 0 for any π ∈ Bδ(π∗) \K which suggests that
πi(x, ai) will increase when moving away from π∗. Thus, π∗ is an unstable equilibrium point of the system of
ODEs (19).
Remark 10. (On the sign function) Recall that sgn was employed since the normal sgn() function is discon-
tinuous. Since sgn can result in the value 0, one can no longer conclude that
√
π∗g = 0 for the points in the
equilibrium set K . Note that the former condition (coupled with feasibility) implies it is an SG-SP point. A naive
fix would be to change OFF-SGSP/ON-SGSP to repeat an action if sgn(·) returned 0. This would ensure that there
are no spurious points in the set K due to sgn being 0. Henceforth, we shall assume that there are no such sgn
induced spurious limit points in the set K .
Lemma 6. For all ai ∈ Ai(x), x ∈ X and i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
π ∈ K ⇒ π ∈ L and
√
πi(x, ai)gix,ai(v
i
pi , π
−i) = 0, (22)
where L =
{
π|π(x) is a probability vector over Ai(x), ∀x ∈ X} .
Proof. The operator Γ¯, by definition, ensures that π ∈ L. Suppose for some ai ∈ Ai(x), x ∈ X and i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N}, we have Γ¯(−
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vipi , π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vpi, π)
∂πi
)
) = 0, but√
πi(x, ai)gi
x,ai
(vipi, π
−i) 6= 0. Then, gi
x,ai
(vipi, π
−i) 6= 0 and since π ∈ L, 1 ≥ πi(x, ai) > 0. We analyze this
condition by considering the following two cases.
Case 1 > pii(x, ai) > 0 and gi
x,a
i(v
i
pi, pi
−i) 6= 0.
In this case, it is possible to find a ∆ > 0 such that for all δ ≤ ∆,
1 > πi(x, ai)− δ
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vipi , π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vpi, π)
∂πi
)
> 0.
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This implies that
Γ¯
(
−
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vipi , π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vpi, π)
∂πi
))
= −
√
πi(x, ai)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vipi , π−i)∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vpi, π)
∂πi
)
6= 0,
⇒
√
πi(x, ai)gix,ai(v
i
pi , π
−i) 6= 0,
which contradicts the initial supposition.
Case pii(x, ai) = 1 and gi
x,ai
(vipi, pi
−i) 6= 0.
Since vipi is solution of the system of ODEs (16), the following should hold:∑
aˆi∈Ai(x)
πi(x, aˆi)gix,aˆi(v
i
pi , π
−i) = πi(x, ai)gix,ai(v
i
pi , π
−i) = 0.
This again leads to a contradiction.
The result follows.
In order to prove Theorem 4, we require the well-known Kushner-Clark lemma (see [Kushner and Clark, 1978,
pp. 191-196]). For the sake of completeness, we recall this result below.
Theorem 5. (Kushner-Clark lemma) Consider the following recursion in d-dimensions:
xn+1 = Γ(xn + b(n)(h(xn) + ζn + βn)), (23)
where Γ projects the iterate xn onto a compact and convex set, say C ∈ Rd. The ODE associated with (23) is given
by
x˙(t) = Γ¯(h(x(t))), (24)
where Γ¯ is a projection operator that keeps the ODE evolution within the set C and is defined as in (20). We make
the following assumptions:
(B1) h is a continuous Rd-valued function.
(B2) The sequence βn, n ≥ 0 is a bounded random sequence with βn → 0 almost surely as n→∞.
(B3) The step-sizes b(n), n ≥ 0 satisfy b(n)→ 0 as n→∞ and ∑n b(n) =∞.
(B4) {ζn, n ≥ 0} is a sequence such that for any ǫ > 0,
lim
n→∞
P
(
sup
m≥n
∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
i=n
b(i)ζi
∥∥∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ
)
= 0.
Suppose that the ODE (24) has a compact set K∗ as its set of asymptotically stable equilibrium points. Then, xn
converges almost surely to K∗ as n→∞.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The updates of π given by (9) on the slower time-scale {b(n)} can be rewritten as: For all ai ∈ Ai(x), x ∈
X and i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
πin+1(x, a
i) = Γ
(
πin(x, a
i)− b(n)(H(πin) + βn)
)
, (25)
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where
H(πin) =
√
πin(x, a
i)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vipin , π−in )∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vpin , πn)
∂πi
)
,
βn =
√
πin(x, a
i)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vin, π−in )∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vn, πn)
∂πi
)
−H(πin).
We now verify the assumptions (B1)–(B4) for the recursion above:
• H(πin) is continuous since each of its components
√
πi,
∣∣∣gix,ai(·, ·)∣∣∣ and sgn(·) are continuous. In partic-
ular, the continuity of gi
x,ai
follows from the fact that both the value function vi(·) and Q-value function
Qi
pi−i
(x, ai) are continuous in πi. This verifies assumption (B1).
• βn → 0 almost surely since |vn − vpin | → 0 as n → ∞, from Theorem 2. Further, βn is bounded as
each of its components are bounded. In particular, gi
x,ai
is bounded as we consider finite state-action spaced
stochastic games, while πi and sgn are trivially upper-bounded. Thus (B2) is satisfied.
• Assumption 1 implies (B3) is satisfied.
• ζn is absent, obviating assumption (B4).
The claim now follows from Kushner-Clark lemma.
Remark 11. Note that from the foregoing, the set K comprises of both stable and unstable attractors and in
principle from Lemma 5, the iterates πin governed by (19) can converge to an unstable equilibrium. In most
practical scenarios, however, a gradient descent scheme is observed to converge to a stable equilibrium. In fact,
the δ-offset policy computed using perturb(·, δ) for every Q > 0 iterations (see Section 9 below) for both of our
algorithms ensures numerically that as n → ∞, πn 9 π∗ ∈ K2. In other words, convergence of the strategy
sequence πn governed by (9) is to the stable set K1.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 4 for ON-SGSP
As mentioned earlier, the analysis for ON-SGSP changes for both timescales and we outline the crucial differences
below, before presenting the detailed analysis.
Step 1: This step establishes that the TD updates along faster timescale converge to the true value functions, using
standard techniques from stochastic approximation. Unlike OFF-SGSP, this step also involves the analysis
of the ξ-recursion. The latter is a consequence of the fact that we work in a model-free setting and hence do
not have access to f(vn, πn) (and hence ∂f(vn, πn)
∂πi(x, ai)
which is required for the policy update).
Step 2: This step establishes that the policy updates track the same ODE (i.e., (19)) as that of OFF-SGSP and the
analysis involves an additional martingale sequence that needs to be bounded.
Step 1: Analysis of v and ξ-recursions
Proposition 3. For a given π, i.e., with πin ≡ πi, updates of v governed by (13) (ON-SGSP) satisfy vn → vpi
almost surely as n → ∞, where vpi is the globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point of the system of ODEs
(16).
Proof. Fix a state x ∈ X . Let {n¯} represent a sub-sequence of iterations in ON-SGSP when the state is x ∈ X .
Also, let Qn = {n¯ : n¯ < n}. For a given π, the updates of v on the faster time-scale {c(n)} given in equation (13)
can be re-written as
vin¯+1(x) = v
i
n¯(x) + c(n¯)
[
J(vin¯) + χ˜n¯
]
,
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where
J(vin¯) =
∑
ai∈Ai(x)
πi(x, ai)gix,ai(v
i
n¯, π
−i), and
χ˜n¯ =
(
rin+βv
i
n(yn)−vin(xn)
)− ∑
ai∈Ai(x)
πi(x, ai)gix,ai(v
i
n¯, π
−i).
Using arguments as before, it is easy to see that J(vin¯) is continuous, χ˜n¯ is such that Eχ˜2n¯ < Cˆ <∞. Thus,
lim
n¯→∞
P
(
sup
m≥n¯
∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
l=n¯
c(l)χ˜l
∥∥∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ
)
≤ Cˆ
ǫ2
lim
n¯→∞
∞∑
l=n¯
c(l)2 = 0.
For the last equality, we have used the fact that the step-sizes are square-summable (see assumption 1). Thus.
all the assumptions of Kushner-Clark Lemma (see Theorem 5 above) are satisfied and we can conclude that vn
governed by (13) converges to the globally asymptotically stable limit point vpi (see equation (17)) of the system
of ODEs (16).
Before establishing the convergence of the gradient estimation recursion, i.e., (14), we require the following
technical result.
Lemma 7.
∂f(v, π)
∂πi(x, ai)
=−
N∑
j=1
gj
x,ai
(vj , π−i), where (26)
gj
x,ai
(vj , π−i) =r¯j(x, π−i, ai) + β
∑
y∈U(x)
p¯j(y|x, π−i, ai)vj(y)− vj(x). (27)
Proof. Let a ∈ A(x) denote the aggregate action vector. Then, we have
∂f(v, π)
∂πi(x, ai)
=− gix,ai(vi, π−i)−
∑
j 6=i
∑
aj∈Aj(x)
πj(x, aj)
( ∑
k 6=i,j
∑
ak∈Ak(x)
∏
k 6=i,j
πk(x, ak)
(
rj(x, a)
+ β
∑
y∈U(x)
p(y|x, a)vj(y)− vj(x)))
= −gix,ai(vi, π−i)−
∑
j 6=i
(∑
k 6=i
∑
ak∈Ak(x)
∏
k 6=i
πk(x, ak)
(
rj(x, a)
+ β
∑
y∈U(x)
p(y|x, a)vj(y)− vj(x))).
Now, from the definition of gj
x,ai
(vi, π−i) in (27), it is easy to see that
∂f(v, π)
∂πi(x, ai)
= −
N∑
j=1
gj
x,ai
(vj , rj , π−i).
Recall that the gradient estimation recursion is as follows:
ξin+1(xn, a
i
n) = ξ
i
n(xn, a
i
n) + c(n)
( N∑
j=1
(
rjn + βv
j
n(yn)− vjn(xn)
)− ξin(xn, ain)
)
.
The following theorem establishes that ξin(x, ai) converges to −
∂f(vn, πn)
∂πi(x, ai)
in the long run.
21
Proposition 4.
∥∥∥∥ξin(x, ai)−
(
−∂f(vn, πn)
∂πi(x, ai)
)∥∥∥∥→ 0 as n→∞ almost surely.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3, let {n¯} represent a sub-sequence of iterations in ON-SGSP when the state
is x ∈ X and Qn := {n¯ : n¯ < n}. For a given π, the updates of ξ on the faster time-scale {c(n)} given in equation
(14) can be re-written as
ξin¯+1(x, a
i) = (1 − c(n¯))ξin¯(x, ai) + c(n¯)
( N∑
j=1
gj
x,ai
(vjn¯, r
j
n¯, π
−i) + ξn¯
)
,
where ξn¯ :=
N∑
j=1
(
rjn¯ + βv
j
n¯(y) − vjn¯(x)
) − N∑
j=1
gj
x,ai
(vjn¯, r
j
n¯, π
−i). Let Fl := σ(vk, ξk, k ≤ l), l ≥ 0 denote an
increasing family of σ-fields. By definition of gj
x,ai
, we have
E
[
rjn¯ + βv
j
n¯(y)− vjn¯(x) | Fn¯, πin¯(xn¯, ain¯)
]
=
N∑
j=1
gj
x,ai
(vjn¯, r
j
n¯, π
−i).
Hence, {ξn¯} is a martingale difference sequence.
As in Proposition 3, define M˜n =
∑
m∈Qn
c(m)χ˜m. It can be easily verified that (M˜m,Fm),m ≥ 0 is a square-
integrable martingale sequence obtained from the corresponding martingale difference {ξm}. Further, from the
square summability of c(n), n ≥ 0, and assumption 2 which ensures that the underlying Markov chain is ergodic
for any given π, it can be verified from the martingale convergence theorem that {M˜m,m ≥ 0}, converges almost
surely. Hence, |ξm| → 0 almost surely on the ‘natural timescale’, as m → ∞. The ‘natural timescale’ is clearly
faster than the algorithm’s timescale and hence ξm can be ignored in the analysis of Bellman error recursion ((14)
in the main paper), see [Borkar, 2008, Chapter 6.2] for detailed treatment of natural timescale algorithms. The
final claim follows from Kushner-Clark lemma.
Step 2: Analysis of pi-recursion
Proof. We first re-write the update of π as follows: For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
πin¯+1(x, a
i) =Γ
(
πin¯(x, a
i)− b(n¯)
(√
πin¯(x, a
i)
∣∣∣gix,ai(vipin¯ , π−in¯ )∣∣∣ sgn
(
∂f(vpin¯ , πn¯)
∂πi
)
+ ζn¯
))
,
where ζn¯ =
√
πin¯(x, a
i)
[∣∣∣gˆix,ai∣∣∣− ∣∣∣gix,ai(vipin¯ , π−in¯ )∣∣∣] sgn
(
∂f(vpin¯ , πn¯)
∂πi
)
. In the above, we have used the con-
verged values of the value update vn and gradient estimate ξn and this is allowed due to timescale separation and
the fact that vn → vpin (see Proposition 3) and ξn → −
∂f(vn, πn)
∂πi(x, ai)
(see Proposition 4). Now, in order to apply
Kushner-Clark lemma (see Theorem 5 above), it is enough if we verify that Eζ2n¯ < ∞, since the rest of the terms
are as in OFF-SGSP (which imply assumptions (B1) to (B3) in Theorem 5 are verified). Now, arguing as before,
it is straightforward to infer that Eζ2n¯ < ∞, since we consider finite state-action spaces and the square of each of
the quantities in the first term in ζn¯ can be upper-bounded. Thus, assumption (B4) in Theorem 5 is verified and
updates of π in ON-SGSP converge to a stable limit point of the system of ODEs (19).
9 Simulation Experiments
We test ON-SGSP, NashQ [Hu and Wellman, 2003] and FFQ [Littman, 2001] algorithms on two general-sum game
setups. We implemented Friend Q-learning variant of FFQ, as each iteration of its Foe Q-learning variant involves
a computationally intensive operation to solve a linear program.
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Player 2→
a1 a2 a3Player 1
↓
a1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0
a2 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0
a3 0, 1 0, 1 1, 1
(a) Payoff matrix.
NashQ FFQ (Friend Q) ON-SGSP
Oscillate or converge
95% 40% 0%to non-Nash strategy
Converge to (0.5, 0.5, 0) 2% 0% 99%
Converge to (0, 0, 1) 3% 60% 1%
(b) Results from 100 simulation runs.
Figure 4: Payoff matrix and simulation results for a single state non-generic two-player game
9.1 Single State (Non-Generic) Game
This is a simple two-player game adopted from Hart and Mas-Colell [2005], where the payoffs to the individual
agents are given in Table 4a. In this game, a strategy that picks a3 (denoted by (0, 0, 1)) constitutes a pure-strategy
NE, while a strategy that picks either a1 or a2 with equal probability (denoted by (0.5, 0.5, 0)) is a mixed-strategy
NE.
We conduct a stochastic game experiment where at each stage, the payoffs to the agents are according to Table
4a and the payoffs accumulate with a discount factor β = 0.8. We performed 100 experimental runs, with each
run corresponding to a length of 10000 stages. The aggregated results from this experiment are presented in Fig.
4b. It is evident that NashQ oscillates and does not converge to NE in most of the runs, while Friend Q-learning
converges to a non-Nash strategy tuple in most of the runs. On the other hand, ON-SGSP converges to NE in all
the iterations.
Figure 5: Stick-Together Game for M = 3
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9.2 Stick-Together Game (STG)
We also define a simple general-sum discounted stochastic game, named “Stick-Together Game” or in short STG,
where two participating agents located on a rectangular terrain would like to come together and stay close to each
other (see Fig. 5). A precise description of the various components of STG is provided below:
1. State Space X : The state specifies the location of both the agents on a rectangular grid of size M ×
M . More precisely, let O = {(x, y)|x, y ∈ Z}. Denote the possible positions of an agent by W :=
{s = (x, y) ∈ O|0 ≤ x, y < M}. Then the state space is given by the Cartesian product X =W ×W .
2. Action SpaceA: The actions available to each agent are to either move to one of the neighboring cells or stay
in the current location. For s ∈ W , let ‖s‖1 = |x|+ |y| be its L1 norm. Then,A(s) = {a ∈ O|‖s+ a‖ ≤ 1}
represents the actions available for an agent to move to one-step neighbouring positions of s ∈ W . The
action space is then defined byA = ∪
s1,s2∈W
A(s1)×A(s2). Let U(s) = {s′ ∈W |‖s′−s‖1 ≤ 1} represent
the set of all next states for an agent in state s ∈W .
3. Transition probability p: We assume that state transitions of individual agents are independent. Let
q(s′|s, ai) represent, for agent i, the probability of transition from state s ∈ W to s′ ∈ W upon taking
action ai ∈ Ai(s). We define
q(s′|s, a) = 2
−‖s′−a‖1∑
s′′∈U(s)
2−‖s′′−a‖1
.
Then, the transition probability is given by
p((s′1, s′2)|(s1, s2), (a1, a2)) = q(s′1|s1, a1)q(s′2|s2, a2).
This transition probability function has the highest value towards that next state to which the action points
to.
4. Reward r: The reward for the two agents is defined as
ri(si, ai) = 1− e‖s1−s2‖1 ,
for state (s1, s2) ∈ X and action (a1, a2) ∈ A(s1)×A(s2). Thus, the reward is zero if the distance between
the two agents is zero. Otherwise, it is a negative and monotonically decreasing function with respect to the
distance between the two agents.
Results. We first show simulation results for a small sized version of the STG game, where M = 3. The number
of states with M = 3 is |X | = 81. We use β = 0.8 for all our experiments. Also, we use the following step-size
sequences in our experiments:
b(n) =
{
0.2 for n < 1000,
1
n0.75
otherwise,
c(n) =
{
0.1 for n < 1000,
1
n
otherwise.
It is easy to see that {c(n)} corresponds to slower time-scale than {b(n)}. It was observed in our experiments that,
using constant step-sizes upto n = 1000 leads to better initial exploration and faster convergence.
To ensure sufficient exploration of the state space (see assumption 2) and also to push the policy π out of
the domain of attraction of any local equilibrium, we perturb the policy as follows: For every Q > 0 iterations,
perturb(·, δ) is used to derive a δ-offset policy for picking actions, i.e., πˆi(x) is used instead of πi(x), where
πˆi(x, ai) =
πi(x, ai) + δ∑
ai∈Ai(x)
(πi(x, ai) + δ)
, ai ∈ Ai(x). (28)
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Figure 6: Performance of our algorithms for STG
Fig. 6a shows the evolution of the objective function f as a function of the number of iterations for OFF-SGSP.
Note that f should go to zero for a Nash equilibrium point.
Fig. 6b shows the evolution of the distance dn (in ℓ1 norm) between the agents for a STG game whereM = 30,
which corresponds to |X | = 810, 000. Notice that the results are shown only for the model-free algorithms: ON-
SGSP, NashQ and FFQ. This is because OFF-SGSP and even the homotopy methods [Herings and Peeters, 2004]
have exponential blow up with M in their computational complexity and hence, are practically infeasible for STG
with M = 30.
From Fig. 6b, it is evident that following the ON-SGSP strategy, the agents converge to a 4 × 4-grid within
the 30 × 30-grid. For achieving this result, ON-SGSP takes about 2 × 107 iterations, implying an average 2 ×
107/|X | ≈ 21 iterations per state. However, NashQ gets the agents to an 8 × 8-grid after a large number of
iterations (≈ 5 × 107). Moreover, from Fig. 6b it is clear that NashQ has not stabilized its strategy in the end.
Friend Q-learning gets the agents to 8× 8-grid, by driving them to one of the corners of the 30× 30-grid. While it
takes a short number of iterations (≈ 30000) to achieve this, FFQ does not explore the state space well and hence,
FFQ’s strategy corresponding to the rest of the grid (excluding the corner to which it takes the agents) is not Nash.
Remark 12. (Runtime performance.) We observed that to complete 5 × 107 iterations, ON-SGSP took ≈ 42
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Figure 7: ON-SGSP with partial information for STG with M = 30
minutes, while NashQ [Hu and Wellman, 2003] took nearly 50 hours, as it involves solving for Nash equilibria of
a bimatrix game in each iteration. The Friend Q-learning variant of FFQ [Littman, 2001] took≈ 33 minutes. The
Foe Q-learning variant of FFQ was not implemented owing to its high per-iteration complexity.
Simple Function Approximation for STG
While OFF-SGSP assumes full information of the game, ON-SGSP assumes that neither rewards nor state tran-
sition probabilities are known. Here, we explore an intermediate information case albeit restricted to STG where
a partial structure of rewards is made known. In particular, we assume that the reward depends on the difference
∆ = (|x11 − x21|, |x12 − x22|) ∈ X in positions x1 = (x11, x12), x2 = (x21, x22) ∈ X of the two agents. We approx-
imate the value function v and strategy π as follows: vi(x) ≈ vˆi(∆) and πi(x) ≈ πˆi(∆), ∀x ∈ X . Thus, the
algorithms need to compute vˆ and πˆ on a low-dimensional subspace W of X . Fig. 7 presents results of ON-SGSP
in this setting for M = 30, which corresponds to |W | = 900. The solution is seen to have converged by 200, 000
iterations (≈ 5 seconds runtime) which suggests that it took on an average 200,000|W | ≈ 22 iterations per ∆ ∈ W to
converge.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, we derived necessary and sufficient SG-SP conditions to solve a generalized optimization problem
and established their equivalence with Nash strategies. We derived a descent (not necessarily steepest) direc-
tion that avoids local minima. Incorporating this direction, we proposed two algorithms - offline, model-based
algorithm OFF-SGSP and online, model-free algorithm ON-SGSP. Both algorithms were shown to converge, in
self-play, to the equilibria of a certain ordinary differential equation (ODE), whose stable limit points coincide with
stationary Nash equilibria of the underlying general-sum stochastic game. Synthetic experiments on two general-
sum game setups show that ON-SGSP outperforms two well-known multi-agent RL algorithms. The experimental
evaluation also suggests that convergence is relatively quick.
There are several future directions to be explored and we outline a few of them below:
1. In simulations, we observed that ON-SGSP can successfully run for large state spaces (|X | ≈ 8, 00, 000).
However, in many cases, the state spaces can be huge and it would be necessary to look for function ap-
proximation techniques for both the value function v as well as strategy-tuple π. Function approximation
techniques are popular in reinforcement learning approaches for high-dimensional MDPs and they bring
in the following advantages: (a) They can cater to huge state and action spaces; and (b) They also aid a
designer to bring in his understanding about the underlying system in terms of features used for function
approximations.
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2. Extensions to the case of constrained games: By constrained stochastic games, we mean those stochas-
tic games that have additional constraints on value functions or strategy-tuple which might arise from the
modelling of a practical scenario. There are some results and applications in this by Altman et al. [2005]
and Altman et al. [2007] which provide the necessary motivation for extending our results to general-sum
constrained stochastic games.
3. Detailed experimental evaluation on a sophisticated benchmark for N -player general-sum stochastic games.
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